Research

My research explores the intersections of epistemology, philosophy of action, philosophy of science, and social philosophy. I also have deep-seated research and teaching interests in areas of political philosophy,  the philosophy of law, as well as tech and business ethics. Across these disparate areas, what I am especially interested in are how the ties that bind us socially have ramifications for proceeding rationally in cooperative settings, especially those where discovering the truth or achieving agreement is our goal. Much of this work is developed in my dissertation, you can read more about it here.

My current research program explores the impact of cooperation on epistemic life. I am also engaged in an ongoing collaboration concerning scientific communication, disagreement and expertise. Below are some threads of these research programs.

Published

• "Zetetic Rights and Wrong(ings)" Phil Quarterly (forthcoming): Defends a class of “zetetic rights” rights distinctive to group inquirers. Zetetic rights protect important central interests of inquirers. Building on arguments by Fricker (2015), explores cases in which zetetic rights are violated: zetetic wronging. Zetetic wronging is distinctive, pervasive, and merits further attention. Publisher's Version.

• “Intentions and Inquiry”  Mind (2024): Defends an approach to understanding inquiry that draws on intentions to answer questions. Shows this approach can offer compelling grounding for controversial zetetic norms. Publisher's Version. NWIP Blog Post.

• “Scientific Disagreement, Fast Science, and Higher-Order Evidence” (w/ Dunja Šešelja). Philosophy of Science (2023).  Publisher's Version

Under Review

• Paper on cooperation and epistemology (R&R, AJP):  Unpacks and defends a variant of central norm of inquiring-together owed to Harman (1986).  In so doing, a general account of shared inquiry is developed, one which sheds light on the complex and surprising relationship between human cooperation and epistemic rationality. Draft.

• Paper on  shared inquiry (under review): Explores the epistemological significance of  breakdowns in inquiring with others and articulates a intention-based approach to shared inquiry, with upshots for debate about normative defeat.

• Paper on joint inquiry with AI systems (under review):  Uses tools from action theory and epistemology alongside results in social robotics and cooperative AI to develop a model of inquiry with autonomous artificial agents (artificial joint inquiry). Argues that recent results suggest artificial joint inquiry is a live possibility, and likely to be very beneficial. Artificial co-inquirers can help compensate for pernicious epistemic blind spots and inquiring together helps reveal when and where our values are (mis)aligned.

• “Expert Judgment: Overlooked Epistemic Reasons” w/ Dunja Šešelja & Will Fleisher (under review, invited contribution to The Epistemology of Expert Judgement, Routledge): Argues that simple evidentialist models of expert judgment are inadequate. Expert judgment must be informed by higher-order evidence and inquisitive reasons to play its social and epistemic function.

Drafts Available/In Progress

• “Against Epistemic Nihilism” (in progress): Are norms of inquiry genuinely epistemic? Nihilists say no: there are no epistemic norms of inquiry, thus no need for revolution to the canons of epistemic normativity. However, discussion has concerned only norms for individual inquirers. When we turn to norms for group inquiry, we can see how nihilists are mistaken.

• “Doing Away with Normative Defeat (Zetetically)” (in progress): Offers an improved explanation of normative defeat by appeal to shared inquiry. The expectations which affect evidence we should have had are explained by norms enjoining us to accommodate the evidence of our co-inquirers. Otherwise, our beliefs will be epistemically irrational.

• “Scaling Up Shared Inquiry” (in progress): Develops and defends a reductive and parsimonious account of massive and diffuse shared inquiry, by appeal to the attitudes in agents’ heads.

• “The Costs of Cooperation” (in progress): Cooperation in the workplace is a good thing, right? Corporate America’s push for workplace cooperation is taken to yield important benefits. Insights from social philosophy and action theory, however, reveal the hidden costs of workplace cooperation, including alienation and breakdowns of shared reasoning.

Future Work

• “Reciprocal Reasoning,” defends a reciprocal aim for an important form of social reasoning, concerned with mutual improvement.

• “Shared Inquiry, Shared Democracy” shows that by turning to shared inquiry, epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy can meet recent challenges.

• “Epistemic Solidarity,” develops an account of epistemic solidarity, which concerns taking on board the modes of inquiry of one’s fellows.

• “Esoteric Epistemology and Epistemic Standards,” explores the social function of epistemic standards, and argues that a healthy epistemic community should,  surprisingly, tolerate and even cultivate non-compliance.

• In the longer term, I intend to develop a philosophical account of cooperation which is informed by models and empirical results from work in anthropology, communication studies, economics, evolutionary biology, and social psychology. I plan to use the account to illuminate the centrality of working together across important human institutions, beyond inquiry: community living, friendship, and social planning, among others.